No question has perhaps attracted as much attention in the economics literature as "Why are some countries richer than others?" In this paper, we revisit the development problem and reevaluate the role of human capital. We find that cross-country differences in this factor are a major contributor to differences in output. The key difference between our paper and recent work in this area is that we use theory to estimate the stocks of human capital, and that we allow the quality of human capital to vary across countries. This results in large cross-country differences in effective human capital per worker.
Introduction
No question has perhaps attracted as much attention in the economics literature as "Why are some countries richer than others?" Much of the current work traces back to Solow's classic work (1956 ). Solow's seminal paper suggested that differences in the rates at which capital is accumulated could account for differences in output per capita. More recently, following the work of Lucas (1988) , human capital disparities were given a central role in the analysis of growth and development. However, the best recent work on the topic reaches the opposite conclusion. Klenow and RodriguezClare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999) and Parente and Prescott (2000) argue that most of the cross country differences in output per worker are not driven by differences in human capital (or physical capital); rather they are due to differences in a residual, total factor productivity (TFP).
In this paper we revisit the development problem. In line with the earlier view, we find that factor accumulation is more important than TFP to explain relative incomes.
The key difference between our work and previous analyses is in the measurement of human capital. The standard approach -inspired by the work of Mincer (1974) -takes estimates of the rate of return to schooling as building blocks to directly measure a country's stock of human capital. Implicitly, this method assumes that the marginal contribution to output of one additional year of schooling is equal to the rate of return. One problem with this procedure is that it is not well suited to handle cross-country differences in the quality of human capital. Following the pioneering work of Becker (1964) and Ben-Porath (1967), we model human capital acquisition as part of a standard income maximization problem. Our set up is flexible enough so that individuals can choose the length of the schooling period -which we identify as a measure of the quantity of human capital-and the amount of human capital per year of schooling and post-schooling training, which we view as a measure of quality.
We use evidence on schooling and age-earnings profile to determine the parameters of the human capital production function. We then compute stocks of human capital as the output of this technology, evaluated at the (individually) optimal choice of inputs given the equilibrium prices. Thus, we use theory -disciplined by observationsto indirectly estimate the stocks of human capital in each country.
We calibrate the model to match some moments of the U.S. economy and, following the standard development accounting approach, we compute the levels of TFP that are required to explain the observed cross-country differences in output per worker. According to the model, relatively modest (of at most 27%) differences in TFP across countries suffice to explain the (large) observed differences in output per worker. Thus, TFP does not explain a large share -in the conventional way that this is estimated-of the differences in output per worker. Our result is mostly driven by our estimates of the average stocks of human capital and by the cross-country differences in demographic structure. We find that cross-country differences in average human capital per worker are much larger than suggested by recent estimates.
Since the model matches actual years of education quite well, we conclude that it is differences in the quality of human capital account for our findings.
We go beyond the development accounting exercise and compute the impact on a country's output per worker of changes in any of the exogenous variables. We consider two exercises. First, we estimate the impact on (long run) output of an exogenous increase in TFP (holding demographic variables constant). We find that the resulting elasticity is fairly large: a 1% increase in (relative) TFP results in a 9%
(long run) increase in (relative) output per worker. This is mostly due to the response of human capital to the change in productivity. The second exercise is designed to evaluate the contribution of demographic characteristics to underdevelopment. In the model, countries differ in terms of life expectancy, retirement age and fertility.
We conduct the following counterfactual experiment: imagine 'endowing' the average country in the lowest decile of the world income distribution with the demographic characteristics of the average country in the top decile. Then let individuals adjust their choices of physical and human capital. We find that this demographic change doubles the level of output in the poor country. 12 Even though we do not use estimates of a Mincer style regression to construct stocks of human capital, we show that the model generates estimated rates of return to schooling that are in the range of those observed in the data. Since international quality differentials in human capital play such an important role we use the model to predict the path of earnings of an immigrant to the U.S. as a function of country of origin. The model is fairly successful at reproducing the time path of income for immigrants given their level of schooling.
The baseline economy relies on differences in TFP and demographics to account for the variability in output per capita. This is an extreme view. It is well documented (see, for example, Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1997) and Hsieh and Klenow (2003) ), that there are significant cross country differences in the price of capital. When we allow the price of capital to vary in the same way as in the data, our model predicts that to account for differences in output per worker no differences in TFP are needed.
Broadly speaking, our approach emphasizes a new dimension (quality of education) that helps explain differences across countries. In this sense it is related to a variety of papers. Chari In section 2 we present the theoretical model. In section 3 we describe the calibration, and in section 4 we present the results. In section 5, we discuss the results and in section 6, we use the model to compute the implications for the return on schooling and for the relative income of immigrants. Section 7 presents some concluding comments. 1 Thus, had we ignored demographic differences, our estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to TFP would be about 6.7, instead of 9.
2 For an excellent review of the connection between demographics and growth see Galor (2005) .
In this section we describe the basic model, characterize its solution, and compute the implications for output per worker using the exogenously specified demographic structure.
The Individual's Problem
The representative individual maximizes the present discounted value of net income.
We assume that each agent lives for T periods and retires at age R ≤ T . The maximization problem is
subject toḣ
and
with h B given. 3 Equations (2) and (3) correspond to the standard human capital accumulation model initially developed by Ben-Porath (1967) . This formulation allows for both market goods, x(a), and a fraction n(a) of the individual's human capital, to be inputs in the production of human capital. Investments in early childhood, which we denote by x E (e.g. medical care, nutrition and development of learning skills), determine the level of each individual's human capital at age 6, h(6), or h E for short.
Our formulation captures the idea that nutrition and health care are important determinants of early levels of human capital, and those inputs are, basically, market 3 The assumption of linear utility is without loss of generality. It can be shown that the solution to the income maximization problem is also the solution to a utility maximization problem when the number of children is given, parents have a bequest motive, and bequests are unconstrained.
For details, see Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) .
goods. 4 .
There are two important features of our formulation. First, we assume that the human capital accumulation technology is the same during the schooling and the training periods. We resisted the temptation to use a more complicated parameterization so as to force the model to use the same factors to account for the length of the schooling period and the shape of the age-earnings profile. Second, we assume that the market inputs used in the production of human capital -x(a)-are privately purchased. In the case of the post-schooling period, this is not controversial.
However, this is less so for the schooling period. Here, we take the 'purely private' approach as a first pass. 5 In fact, for our argument to go through, it suffices that, at the margin, individuals pay for the last unit of market goods allocated to the formation of human capital.
The full solution to the income maximization problem is presented in the Appendix. The solution to the problem is such that n(a) = 1, for a ≤ 6 + s. Thus, we identify s as the number of years of schooling. The following proposition characterizes s.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique solution to the income maximization problem.
The number of years of schooling, s, satisfies 1.
4 It is clear that parents' time is also important. However, given exogenous fertility, it seems best to ignore this dimension. For a full discussion see Manuelli and Seshadri (2005) . 5 An alternative explanation is that Tiebout like arguments effectively imply that public expenditures on education play the same role as private expenditures. The truth is probably somewhere in between.
where
, and
provided that
Otherwise the privately optimal level of schooling is 0.
2. The level of human capital at the age at which the individual finishes his formal schooling is given by
Proof. : See the Appendix There are several interesting features of the solution.
1. The Technology to Produce Human Capital and the Impact of Macroeconomic Conditions. The proposition illustrates the role played by economic forces in inducing a feedback from aggregate variables to the equilibrium choice of schooling. To be precise, had we assumed that market goods do not appear in the production of human capital (i.e. γ 2 = υ = 0), the model implies that changes in wage rates have no impact on schooling decisions. (See equation (4)). Thus, the standard formulation that assumes that market goods are not used in the production of human capital has to rely on differences in interest rates or the working horizon as the only source of equilibrium differences in schooling across countries. 6 Our formulation is flexible enough so that the impact of wages on equilibrium schooling is ambiguous. The reason is simple: Pre-schooling investments in human capital and schooling are substitutes;
hence, depending on the productivity of market goods in the production of early childhood human capital relative to schooling human capital, increases in wages may increase or decrease schooling. To be precise, if υ is sufficiently high (and
, increases in market wages make parents more willing to invest in early childhood human capital. Thus at age 6 the increase in human capital (relative to a low υ economy) is sufficiently large that investments in schooling are less profitable. In this case, the equilibrium level of s decreases.
Even though theoretically possible, this requires extreme values of υ. In our parameterization γ 2 − υ(1 − γ 1 ) > 0, and we obtain the more 'normal' response:
high wage (and high TFP) economies are also economies with high levels of schooling. This is an important source of differences in the equilibrium years of schooling that individuals in different countries decide to acquire. 3. Development and Schooling Quality. In the context of this model there is a natural way to distinguish between quantity and quality of schooling. We specify that if two individuals choose the same value of s their levels of schooling are identical. However, the quality of schooling is measured by the differences in human capital, as given by h(6 + s). To illustrate the implications of the model for the impact of development on quality, consider two countries with level of real wages given by w 0 > w, and no differences in interest rates. Now suppose that two individuals residing in these two countries choose the same level of schooling. This, of course, requires that these individuals differ along some other dimension. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that their initial levels of human capital, h B , are adjusted to that the (endogenous) value of s is the same. In this case, (5) implies that the individual in the country with the higher wage rate also has more capital. The elasticity of h(s+6) with respect to w is γ 2 /(1 − γ), which is fairly large in our preferred parameterization. 7 This result illustrates one of the major implications of the approach that we take in measuring human capital in this paper: differences in years of schooling are not perfect (or even good in some cases) measures of differences in the stock of human capital. Cross-country differences in the quality of schooling can be large, and depend on the level of development. If R − s does not vary much across countries, and since, in the steady state, wages are proportional to TFP, it follows from (5) that
where θ stands for capital's share of income, and z is TFP. Thus, the elasticity of initial human capital with respect to TFP is γ 2 / (1 − θ) (1 − γ). It is clear that if the human capital production technology is 'close' to constant returns, then the model will predict large cross country differences in human capital even if TFP differences are small.
Equilibrium Age-Earnings Profiles
Even though the model is very explicit about market income and investments in human capital, it says very little about the timing of payments and who pays for what. In particular, during the post-schooling period it is necessary to determine who pays for the time and good costs associated with training. In order to define measured income at age a, y(a) we assume that a fraction π of post-schooling expenses in market goods are paid for by employers, and subtracted from measured wages.
Thus,
Given the solution to the income maximization problem (see equation (31) in the Appendix), measured income as a function of experience, defined as p = a − s − 6, and schooling, s, iŝ
m(p + 6 + s)
The functionŷ(s, p) summarizes the implications of the model for the age-earnings profile of an individual. In some sense, one could view this expression as the model's analog of a Mincer-style relationship. However, it is necessary to exercise some caution in order to make this comparison. These are two important reasons why our set-up differs from the Mincerian framework.
First, unlike in Mincer's theory, schooling is endogenous and varying s inŷ(s, p)
can give rise to biased estimates. 8 Thus, in the context of this model it is necessary to be explicit about the factors that induce different individuals to choose different levels of s. Second, ln(ŷ(s, p)) is a highly nonlinear function of s. This is the case regardless of whether differences in schooling are due to differences in ability (z h ) or due to differences in the initial stock of human capital (h B ).
Equilibrium
Given the interest rate, standard profit maximization pins down the equilibrium capital-human capital ratio. However to determine output per worker, it is necessary to compute 'average' human capital in this economy. As the previous derivations show, the amount of human capital supplied to the market depend on an individual's age. Thus, to compute average 'effective' human capital we need to use the age structure of the population.
Demographics We assume that each individual has e f children at age B. Since we consider only steady states, we need to derive the stationary age distribution of this economy associated with this fertility rate. Our assumptions imply
It is easy to check that in the steady state
and η = f/B is the growth rate of population.
Aggregation To compute output per worker it suffices to estimate the per capita aggregate amount of human capital effectively supplied to the market, and the physical capital -human capital ratio. Leth be given bȳ
Equilibrium Optimization on the part of firms implies that
where κ is the physical capital -human capital ratio. The wage rate per unit of human capital, w, is,
Then, output per worker is
We use standard functional forms. The production function is assumed to be Cobb-
Our calibration strategy involves choosing the parameters so that the steady state implications of the model economy presented above is consistent with observations for the United States (circa 2000). Thus, we calibrate the model to account for contemporaneous observations in the U.S. We then vary the exogenous demographic variables and choose the level of TFP for other countries so that the model's predictions for output per worker match that for the chosen country. Consequently, while TFP for other countries is chosen so as to match output per worker by construction, the model makes predictions on years of schooling, and the amount of goods inputs used in the production of human capital.
Following Cooley and Prescott (1995) , the depreciation rate is set at δ k = .06.
Less information is available on the fraction of job training expenditures that are not reflected in wages. There are several reasons why earnings ought not to be equated with wh(1 − n) − x. First, some part of the training is off the job and directly paid for by the individual. Second, firms typically obtain a tax break on the expenditures incurred on training. Consequently, the government (and indirectly, the individual through higher taxes) pays for the training and this component is not reflected in wages. Third, some of the training may be firm specific, in which case the employer is likely to bear the cost of the training, since the employer benefits more than the individual does through the incidence of such training. Finally, there is probably some smoothing of wage receipts in the data and consequently, the individual's marginal productivity profile is likely to be steeper than the individual's wage profile. For all these reasons, we set π = 0.5. We experiment later with π = 0 and π = 1. We also assume that the same fraction π is not measured in GDP.
Our theory implies that it is only the ratio h
) that matters for all the moments of interest. Consequently, we can choose z, p k (which determine w) and h B arbitrarily and calibrate z h to match a desired moment. The calibrated value of z h is common to all countries. Thus, the model does not assume any cross-country differences in an individual's 'ability to learn.' We set B = 25 and R = min{64, T }.
This leaves us with 7 parameters, θ, r, δ h , z h , γ 1 , γ 2 and υ. The moments we seek in order to pin down these parameters are: Our estimates are fairly standard. As argued before, the responsiveness of output to TFP depends significantly on the curvature of the production function of human capital (i.e. the vector (γ 1 , γ 2 )). The values are essentially determined by the shape of the age-earnings profile in the data. We discuss the implications of alternative values later. 9 
Results
Before turning to the results, we first describe the data so as to get a feel for the observations of interest. We start with the countries in the PWT 6.1 and put them in deciles according to their output per worker, y. Next, we combine them with observations on years of schooling (s), expenditures per pupil relative to output per worker (x s ), life expectancy (T ), total fertility rate (f ), and the relative price of capital (p k ) for each of these deciles. The population values are displayed in the following table. 9 The coefficient of capital in the production function, θ, does not coincide with capital share due to the unmeasured component of post-schooling training. In our calculations, unmeasured post-schooling training is approximately 4.7% of measured output. Table 1 illustrates the wide disparities in incomes across countries. The United
States possesses an output per worker that is about 20 times as high as the countries in the bottom decile. Further notice that years of schooling also varies systematically with the level of income -from about 2 years at the bottom deciles to about 11 at the top. The quality of education as proxied by the expenditures on primary and secondary schooling as a fraction of GDP also seems to increase with the level of development. This measure should be viewed with a little caution as it includes only public inputs and not private inputs (including the time and resources that parents invest in their kids). Next, notice that demographic variables also vary systematically with the level of development -higher income countries enjoy greater life expectancies and lower fertility rates. More important, while demographics vary substantially at the lower half of the income distribution, they do not move much in the top half.
Finally, the relative price of capital in the richest countries is about a third of the level in the poorest countries.
Development Accounting We now examine the ability of the model to simultaneously match the cross country variation in output per capita and years of schooling. To isolate the role of human capital, we ignore cross-country differences in the price of capital. Thus, we set p k = 1 in every country (we relax this later). To be clear, we change R (retirement age) and e f (fertility rate) and T (life expectancy) across countries (according to the data) and choose the level of TFP in a particular country so as to match output per worker. Table 2 presents the predictions of the model and the data. What is driving our results? Since we take schooling to be endogenous, it is possible that our model requires smaller differences in TFP because it implies large differences in schooling or, alternatively, that it allocates too many resources to schooling and, hence, it exaggerates the differences across countries. We now argue that this is not the case. The implications for average schooling across deciles of the world income distribution match the available data reasonably well. In terms of a rough measure of quality such as schooling expenditures as a fraction of output, the model actually underpredicts investment at the two ends of the world income distribution. 10 Thus, this cannot explain our findings. 11 We used the model to compute the elasticity of output with respect to TFP when all factors are allowed to vary (this is the very long run), and the economy has adjusted to the new steady state. We estimate this elasticity to be around 9. This estimate suggest that, in the long run, there are large payoffs in terms of output per worker of small changes in TFP. 10 The model overpredicts x s for countries in the middle of the distribution. 11 As mentioned before, the model makes predictions on the total amount of goods used in the production of schooling including the value of goods and time parents allocate to educating their Changing Demographics Imagine holding TFP fixed at the baseline level (where the relative price of capital is also held fixed) and imagine changing all the demographic variables to the US level. The results of such an experiment are presented in Table 3 . (from 5.2% to 12.3% of the U.S. level). This is accompanied by the doubling in the level of schooling. In this experiment, demographic change drives both schooling and output. Thus, the model is consistent with the view that changes in fertility can have large effects on output. It is important to emphasize that our quantitative estimates reflect long run changes. The reason is that they assume that the level of human capital has fully adjusted to its new steady state level. Given the generational structure, this adjustment can take a long time.
As expected, even though demographic change will substantially help poor countries, it will not have much of an impact among the richest countries. For example, for countries in the second decile (with initial income between 80% and 90% of the richest countries) there is no change in output per worker.
From a methodological point of view, ignoring the age structure of the population would have resulted in a much smaller estimated impact of TFP on output per worker.
To be precise, had we assumed that every country has the same demographic structure as the U.S., we would have found that the level of TFP required to match (relative) output per worker in the lowest decile 65% of the U.S. (instead of 73%). This reduces the estimated elasticity of output per worker with respect to TFP by about 30%.
Even though we find large effects associated with demographic change our results should be viewed with caution since we assume that demographic change is orthogonal to changes in TFP, while in a model of endogenous fertility it is likely that macro conditions will affect fertility decisions (and longevity). The important observation is that changes in fertility induced by aggregate changes can have large effects on income through their impact on human capital accumulation decisions. In ongoing work, we study the impact that changes in TFP have upon (endogenously chosen) fertility. we now allow p k to vary according to the values in Table 1 . Table 4 presents the results. When the price of capital varies according to the data, no differences in the level of productivity are needed to account for the world income distribution. Thus, differences in the price of capital and endogenous accumulation of inputs (mostly human capital) can account for all of the observed differences in output per worker.
Differences in the Price of Capital

The Role of Human Capital: Discussion
In this section we describe some of the implications of the model. We emphasize those aspects that provide us insights on how cross-country differences in TFP can account for differences in schooling and the quality of human capital. The standard approach uses an estimate of φ i = φ ≈ 0.10, which corresponds to a 10% return. Thus, if we take a country from the lowest decile with s P = 2, and assuming that the average worker in the U.S. has 12 years of schooling, we estimate that the average human capital of the poor country (relative to the U.S.) iŝ
Our approach, in a reduced form sense, allows for the Mincerian intercepts to vary across countries. Thus in our specification, we can view average human capital in
If, as before, we compare a country from the bottom decile of the output distribution with the U.S., Table 5 implies that its relative average human capital is 0.08.
It follows that our measure of quality, for this pair of countries, is simply
Thus, our numerical estimate is that the quality of human capital in a country in the lowest decile is approximately one fifth of that of the U.S. In our model, this ratio is driven by differences in wages and demographics. The magnitude of the differences in relative quality suggests that ignoring this dimension can induce significant biases in the estimates of human capital.
12 12 In a recent paper, Caselli (2003) explicitly models, in a reduced form sense, differences in C i across countries. He then uses some empirical results to estimate how much of the differences in country characteristics can explain differences in quality and concludes that these cannot be important factors. Our results differ from his in that we use an explicit model to compute quality differentials.
The Production Function of Human Capital As our discussion shows, our results depend on the degree of returns to scale in the production of human capital as given by γ 1 and γ 2 . Our estimate is γ = γ 1 + γ 2 = 0.93. Prior research found a range of values from about 0.5 to 1. The key element that allows us to pin down a value of γ is that we require that our parameterization explain both the number of years of schooling and the evidence on age-earnings profile. Most previous work including Ben-Porath, Haley and others estimate the model taking schooling as given. Consequently, estimations of the Ben Porath model have focused on the period of specialization (post schooling). 13 The (apparently) high value of γ is needed to match the age earnings profile and the schooling level that we see in the data.
In Table 5 we show the impact of changing γ (keeping the ratio of γ 1 to γ 2 unchanged) on the predictions of the Ben-Porath model for the ratio of earnings between ages 25 and 50. decreasing age earnings profile. The intuition for these results parallels the findings in growth models: In the case of constant returns to scale the optimal solution is to 13 As exception is important work by Heckman, Lochner and Taber who use different technologies for producing schooling and training on the job -in particular they assume that while schooling is goods intensive in the sense that there are (exogenous) tuition costs, goods do not matter for the production of training. 14 Alternative parametrizations had a small impact on the predictions of the model for the ratio of earnings at age R and age 50. This moment appears to be largely determined by the depreciation rate. Thus, we do not report the results.
'jump' to the balanced growth path instantaneously; however, given finite lifetimes and depreciation, the optimal path of human capital accumulation demands a slow decrease over time. Thus, earnings at age 50 are, counterfactually, below than those at age 25. If the production function of human capital displays returns to scale that are lower than the calibrated values, standard arguments imply 'slow' convergence and, hence, a high ratio of earnings at age 50 relative to earnings at age 25.
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To summarize, the calibrated values of the parameters of the production function are tightly pinned down by the shape of the age earnings profile. 16 The Importance of Early childhood, and On-the-Job Training Our model implies that, even at age 6, there are large differences between the human capital of the average child in rich and poor countries. In Table 6 we present the values of human capital at age 6 (h E ) for each decile relative to the U.S. 15 If one fixes γ 2 = 0.33 and changes γ 1 the results are similar. If γ 1 = .55, the earnings ratio is 4.03, while if it is set to .65 the earnings ratio decreases to 0.72. 16 The chosen parametrization is also consistent wit some estimates of the fraction of time allocated to prooducing human capital. In the model we estimate such a fraction asn = R R Even though the differences in early childhood capital are small for the relatively rich countries (output per worker at least 75% of the U.S.), the differences are large when comparing rich and poor countries. Our estimates suggest that a six year old from a country in the bottom decile has less than 50% of the human capital of a U.S.
child.
Some Implications of the Model
The main difference between our set-up and other approaches lies in the specification of the production function of human capital. It seems natural then to 'test' the model 17 In a recent paper, Caselli (2003) explicitly models, in a reduced form sense, differences in C i across countries. He then uses some empirical results to estimate how much of the differences in country characteristics can explain differences in quality and concludes that these cannot be important factors. Our results differ from his in that we use an explicit model to compute quality differentials.
by confronting some of its implications with the data. There are two dimensions that seem worth exploring. First, since our estimates of the stock of human capital are very different from those obtained using estimates of a Mincer-style regression, it is not clear whether data generated by our model can match the estimated return to schooling. Second, since our model relies on cross country differences in the quality of human capital it has sharp implications about the incomes of immigrants. To test how reasonable the model is, we compare the predictions of the model with the evidence on the behavior of earnings of immigrants.
Mincer Regressions
Even though the interpretation and the precise point estimate of the schooling coefficient in a Mincer regression are controversial, most estimates -at least when linearity is imposed-seem to be close to 10%. 18 Thus, one challenge for the model economy is to reproduce the rate of return in a Mincer-style regression.
However, since the model predicts that all (homogeneous) individuals choose exactly the same level of schooling, it is necessary to introduce some source of microeconomic heterogeneity. To generate differences among individuals within a country the model has two natural candidates: differences in z h (ability to learn), and differences in h B (initial human capital). From the results in Proposition 1 it follows that the equilibrium years of schooling depend on the ratio h
¢ . Since in a given country all individuals face the same wage and interest rate, differences in s are driven by differences in (z h , h B ). These two variables have very different impacts on lifetime earnings. Heterogeneity in z h results in lifelong differences in earnings (lack of convergence across individuals), while differences in h B get smaller with age. 18 The assumption that the relationship between log earnings and schooling is linear is also controversial. Heckman, Lochner and Todd document significant non-linearities. More recently, Belzil and Hansen (2002) find that, when the return is allowed to be a sequence of spline functions, the function is convex.
For our computations we varied z h (and h B ) so as to generate lifetime earnings for individuals who choose to acquire between 0 and 20 years of education. Given the non-linearity of the earnings function, we need population weights of individuals in different categories of experience and schooling. We obtain these population weights from the NLSY, with schooling ranging from 0 through 20 and experience going from 5 to 45. We then proceed in two steps: If the only source of heterogeneity is in ability, we adjust z h from it's baseline value in order to obtain the ability levels that lead to the different schooling levels. Thus, there will be as many ability levels as there are schooling levels. We also have their predicted age earnings profiles. Next, we draw observations from the experience-schooling categories depending on their population weights. For instance, if the group with 12 years of schooling and 10 years of experience has a mass of .1 while the group with 12 years of schooling and 30 years of experience has a mass of .05, we then draw twice as many observations from the first category relative to the second. We then run a standard Mincer regression with schooling, experience and the square of experience as independent variables and the logarithm of earnings on the left. We repeat these steps and recover the Mincerian return when the only source of variation is in initial human capital.
19
The Mincer coefficient generated by variation in ability alone is around 13% while that obtained from variation in h B alone is close to 0. In order to obtain a point estimate of the return, we need to know the joint distribution of z h and h B . However, given the rather tight bounds that we obtain, we conclude that the model is consistent with the 'stylized fact' that the Mincerian return for the United States is around 8%.
As a second test, we computed for each representative country in our world distribution of output (10 countries in all) the effect on log earnings of an additional year of education, and we took this to be the return on schooling in country (decile) i. We then regressed this return on the log of GDP per capita and obtained a coefficient of -0.10 (when z h is the only source of heterogeneity), and -0.04 (when h B varies). This 19 We follow the same procedure when we adjust h B .
is to be compared with a similar exercise -with actual data-run by Banerjee is not the case. The key observation is that along a given earnings-schooling profile (for a given country) only individual characteristics are changing, while the profiles of different countries reflect differences in demographics and wage rates. It is possible to show that demographic differences and differences in wage rates imply that the earnings-schooling profile of a poor country lies below that of a rich country. It turns out, that the poor country profile is also steeper than the rich country profile.
Since the return to formal education is, approximately, the derivative of the earningsschooling profile, it is the increased steepness of the earnings-schooling profile as TFP decreases (a cross-country effect) that dominates the convexity of the profile as schooling increases (for a given level of TFP) that is the dominant effect that accounts for the cross-country observations.
Immigrant Evidence
A key prediction of the model is that the quality of human capital varies (inversely) with the level of development. Thus, it implies that if we compare two individuals with the same level of schooling acquired in different countries, their effective amount of human capital will also be different. A simple test of the model would be to bring an individual from a poor country to a rich country and observe his income relative to a native with the same schooling.
One imperfect piece of evidence related to this thought experiment is provided by the experience of immigrants in relatively rich countries. Our casual reading of this literature suggests the following stylized facts (related to immigrants in the U.S.).
Fact 1 Immigrants earn initially lower income than comparable natives with the same level of schooling. This wage differential has been increasing over time.
Fact 2
The growth rate of earnings of immigrants is higher than the growth rate of earnings of similar -in terms of measurable characteristics-natives. . We analyze earnings of a 25 year old migrant who chooses not to go back to school. 20 Our theory implies that an immigrant from a poor country will earn less than a native and that he will choose to invest more in human capital since he starts with a lower stock of human capital than the comparable native. Thus, our theory also predicts some catch-up. It is clear that, qualitatively, the model is consistent with the facts.
We now discuss the ability of the model to match the data from a quantitative point of view.
Fact 1 Borjas (1994) estimates that, for recent arrivals, the percentage wage differential between immigrant and native men increased from -16.6% in 1970 to -31.7% 20 Had we chosen to study a younger immigrant, the model would have predicted that some of them -depending on the country of origin-would enroll in school after migrating to the U.S. This is consistent with the findings of Betts and Lofstrom (2000), but we do not pursue this line here.
in 1990 (see Borjas (1994) , Table 3 ). In order to estimate the implications of the model, we need time series estimates of the schooling levels for natives and immigrants, as well as the 'identity' of their country of origin, so that we can estimate the change in 'quality' of the human capital of the average immigrant.
Borjas (1992) estimates that, in 1970, the average immigrant had .2 years of education less than a native (who had 11.3 years at the time), while in 1990 we estimate that the average immigrant had 12.5 years of schooling (natives had 13). 21 Fact 2 Borjas (1994) reports the evidence on the growth rate of earnings of immigrants relative to natives. The precise amount of catch-up is controversial (see Borjas (1994) for a discussion), but it is in the range of 6-15% for the first decade after immigration to 10-25% for the first two decades after immigration. 21 This estimate implies that the gap between immigrants and natives that was estimated to be large in 1980 by Borjas, has narrowed in the 1990s. For evidence on this see Betts and Lofstrom (2000) . 22 The model underpredicts the drop in income. However, this is due to our choice of concentrating on selecting immigrants in terms of z h . If immigrants were selected only in terms of diffferences in h B , the model predicts differences of -37% and -51%. Thus if the proportion of 'z h immigrants' was 92% in 1970 and 68% in 1990, the model would perfectly predict the observed differences in income. The increase in the proportion of immigrants who gain less from immigrating is consistent with the change in U.S. immigration policy that reduced the number of 'economic' migrants in favor of individuals with family ties.
We analyzed the 10 and 20 year average growth rate of earnings (relative to natives with the same years of schooling) for two individuals: one that comes from a country in the middle of the world income distribution and the other that comes from a country in the lowest decile. As before, we considered both individuals that differ in terms of their h B , as well as immigrants who differ (from their fellow country men) in terms of z h . 23 The results (the first number corresponds to h B , while the second gives the predictions for z h ) are presented in Table 7 . Our estimates fall within the range reported in the literature and capture the actual amount of catch-up Table 7 . of origin and in the U.S. They find that migration is associated with significant increases in earnings. The reported differences correspond to average 'before' and 'after' wages. Large differences are evidence of substantial TFP differences. However, Jasso and Rosenzweig also report that 24% of the sample earned less in the U.S. than in their country of origin. The small sample size (230 observations), the imputation criteria 24 , and the lack of data that would allow us to use our model to predict earnings 25 , makes us cautious about using these estimates. 26 In research that is quite close in spirit to our work, Hendricks (2002) , uses earnings of immigrants to the U.S. to estimate the human capital in the country of origin.
He concludes that human capital differences cannot account for a large share of the Hendricks' results are not inconsistent with the model in this paper. In order to 24 Jasso and Rosenzweig inputed full time earnings on the basis of their information. They do not report what fraction of the sample had its earnings inputed. 25 To be precise, we need data on the time elapsed between last job in the country and first job in the U.S. so that we can use our model to adjust for changes in human capital. 26 In addition, Hendricks (2002) reports that in an earlier paper, Jasso, Rosenzeig and Smith (1998), they find no effects on Mexican immigrants who, we suspect, comprise a significant proportion of the sample. 27 The efficiency levels in the one type of human capital model can be estimated from the information in Table 1 Table. Hendricks sample is not comparable to ours. There is nodata for any country in the lowest decile, and data for only two countries for the second poorest decile. We thank Lutz Hendricks for his help in interpreting his estimates. use our model to 'predict' the efficiency parameter we need to estimate the human capital of a migrant from a given country with a given number of years of education.
For example, the average years of schooling of immigrants from the only two countries in the second lowest decile in Hendricks' sample 28 is over 15, while the average years of schooling in the decile of origin is 4.64. In order to 'produce' an individual with 15 years of schooling from the second lowest decile, we followed the same strategy and picked his z h to match the level of schooling of immigrants. 29 In this case, our estimates of efficiency are around 80-90%, and broadly consistent with Hendricks'. 30 Overall, the model does a reasonable job at tracking the earnings dynamics of immigrants, even though it was not designed for that purpose. In particular, the evidence on immigrant income lends support to the view that at least some of the differences in output per worker are driven by differences in the quality of human capital. 31 
Conclusion
Our results show that human capital has a central role in determining the wealth of nations. In particular, we show that an extended neoclassical model that incorporates 28 These countries are Ghana and Kenya. Ethiopia, which is in the poorest 10%, is listed in the Appendix, but no data are presented in Table 1 . 29 This implies that this "high z h " indvidual invests more in human capital than the "average z h " individual in his country of origin. Thus, when he "arrives" in the U.S. (with 15 years of schooling), his human capital is significantly higher than the average for his country of origin. 30 Hendricks finds that for many countries, including some relatively poor countries, the efficiency parameter exceeds 100%. Our model, by construction, has to find efficiency levels below 100%. Of course, this ignores selection. 31 In our discussion we completely ignored the impact of differences in languages and learning about the host country environment. These are important considerations and a search model or a set-up along the lines of Jovanovic (1979) models can also account for steeper age-earnings profiles and lower initial wages. These generalizations are beyond the scope of this paper. For a nice exposition of other theories of of the earnings distribution, see Neal and Rosen (1999) .
a human capital sector is capable of generating large differences in the stocks of human capital with these differences arising out of small differences in TFP. The novelty is that the framework that we use implies that the quality of human capital varies systematically with the level of development. The model is quite successful in capturing the large variation in levels of schooling across countries and is also consistent with the cross-country evidence on rates of return, as well the behavior of earnings of immigrants. The model also implies that a large fraction of the crosscountry differences in output are due to differences in the quality of human capital.
To be precise, the typical individual in a poor country not only chooses to acquire fewer years of schooling, he also acquires less human capital per year of schooling.
The conventional wisdom is that cross-country differences in human capital are small and that consequently differences in TFP are large. Hence policies that achieve small changes in TFP cannot have large effects on output per capita. Moreover, using the Mincer approach that takes schooling as exogenous, those models effectively give up on trying to understand the impact of TFP on human capital accumulation. We find that, the elasticity of output per worker with respect to TFP is slightly over 9. The model suggests that there are huge payoffs to understanding what explains productivity differences. Thus, in our model, productivity differences play a central role in explaining development.
We also find a significant role for policies that induce demographic change. We estimate that if a country in the lowest decile of the world income distribution was endowed with the demographic characteristics of the representative country in the top decile, output per worker would double.
Naturally, the consideration of capital market imperfections such as binding intergenerational loan markets (which will result in the steady state of the open economy version of the model presented above) will only increase the role played by demographics and further reduce the importance of TFP. In ongoing work, we are studying the impact of a variety of human capital policies in the presence of distortions, as well as
Appendix
The first order conditions of the income maximization problem given the stock of human capital at age 6, h(6) = h E are,
with equality if n< 1, (11a)
where a ∈ [6, R], and q(a) is the costate variable. The appropriate transversality condition is q(R) = 0.
For simplicity, we prove a series of lemmas that simplify the proof of Proposition 1. It is convenient to define several functions that we will use repeatedly.
Let
, and m(a) = 1 − e −(r+δ h )(R−a) .
The following lemma provides a characterization of the solution in the post schooling period.
Lemma 2 Assume that the solution to the income maximization problem is such that n(a) = 1 for a ≤ 6 + s for some s. Then, given h(6 + s) the solution satisfies, for a ∈ [6 + s, R),
Proof of Lemma 2. : Given that the equations (11) hold (with the first equation at equality), standard algebra (see Ben-Porath, 1967 and Haley, 1976) shows that (14) holds. Using this result in (11b) it follows that
which is (12) . Next substituting (12) and (14) into (11d) one obtains a non-linear nonhomogeneous first order ordinary differential equation. Straightforward, but tedious, algebra shows that (13) is a solution to this equation.
The next lemma describes the solution during the schooling period.
Lemma 3 Assume that the solution to the income maximization problem is such that n(a) = 1 for a ≤ 6+s for some s. Then, given h(6) = h E and q(6) = q E , the solution satisfies, for a ∈ [6, 6 + s),
Proof of Lemma 3. : From (11b) we obtain that
Since we are in the region in which the solution is assumed to be at a corner, (11a)
In order to better characterize the solution we now show that the shadow value of the total product of human capital in the production of human capital grows at a constant rate. More precisely, we show that For a ∈ [6, 6 + s), q(a)h(a)
].
However, it follows from (11c) and (11d) after substituting (17) thaṫ
The function M(a) satisfies the first order ordinary differential equatioṅ
whose solution is
which establishes the desired result. Using this result, the level of expenditures during the schooling period is given by
Substituting this expression in the law of motion for h(a) (equation (11d), the equilibrium level of human capital satisfies the following first order non-linear, nonhomogeneous, ordinary differential equatioṅ
It can be verified, by direct differentiation, that (16) is a solution.
The next lemma describes the joint determination, given the age 6 level of human capital h E , of the length of the schooling period, s, and the age 6 shadow price of human capital, q E .
Lemma 4
Given h E , the optimal shadow price of human capital at age 6, q E , and the length of the schooling period, s, are given by the solution to the following two Proof of Lemma 4. To prove this result, it is convenient to summarize some of the properties of the optimal path of human capital. For given values of (q E , h E , s) the optimal level of human capital satisfies
(e which is (19) . Next, using (21) evaluated at a = 6 + s, and (18) at equality (and substituting out q(6 + s)) using either one of the previous expressions we obtain (20) .
We now discuss the optimal choice of h E . Since q E is the shadow price of an additional unit of human capital at age 6, the household chooses x E to solve
The solution is
Proof of Proposition 1. Uniqueness of a solution to the income maximization problem follows from the fact that the objective function is linear and, given γ < 1, the constraint set is strictly convex. Even though existence can be established more
generally, in what follows we construct the solution. To this end, we first describe the determination of years of schooling. Combining (19) and (20) it follows that h E = e δ h s m(s + 6) Next, using (19) in (24) , h E must satisfy h E = h .
Finally, (25) and (26) .
As in the statement of the proposition, let the left hand side of (27) be labeled F (s). .
Inspection of the function F (s) shows that there exists a unique value of s, says, such that F (s) > 0, for s <s, and F (s) ≤ 0, for s ≥s. It is clear thats < R − 6.
Hence, the function F (s) must intersect the right hand side of (27) 
for a ∈ [6 + s, R].
The amount of market goods allocated to the production of human capital is given by x(a) = µ γ 2 w r + δ h ¶ C h (z h , w, r)m(6 + s) 
The level of human capital of an individual of age a in the post-schooling period (i.e. a ≥ 6 + s) is given by h(a) = C h (z h , w, r){e −δ h (a−s−6) γ 1 r + δ h m(6 + s) The stock of human capital at age 6, h E , is 
